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Veil Piercing and Abuse of the Corporate
Form
Diederik Bruloot, Louis De Meulemeester & Christoph Van der Elst
§8.01 INTRODUCTION
Limited liability is considered one of the key features of the company.1 However, it
comes at a cost: it shifts risks from shareholders to creditors who do not necessarily
have the possibility to protect themselves. It opens the doors for abusive use of the
protective mechanism of limited liability. Hence the question is raised how legal
instruments can help to mitigate this risk. Piercing the corporate veil is considered one
of the traditional techniques to protect third parties against the risks stemming from
limited liability, next to the directors’ liability for breach of their, often very broadly
defined, duties vis-à-vis the company.2 This chapter specifically examines the concept
‘veil piercing’ as one of the core remedies in case of abuse of companies. Particularly,
it aims at identifying the different types of abuse of companies that can lead to veil
piercing. ‘Veil piercing’ turns to be a highly divergent concept but shows the key
characteristic that there is a court order that sets aside legal personality or limited
liability of the company leading to the personal liability of shareholders for the debts of
the company.
By drawing up our typology regarding types of abuse that can lead to veil
piercing, we take an international, comparative viewpoint, searching for what could be
called ‘generally accepted principles’ on veil piercing in case of abuse of companies,
rather than collating a complete catalogue of the different grounds on which the
1. J. Armour, H. Hansmann, R. Kraakman, M. Pargendler, What is corporate law? in R. Kraakman,
J. Armour, P. Davies et al. (eds.), The anatomy of corporate law: a comparative and functional
approach, Oxford University Press, 5 (2017).
2. For a detailed assessment of directors’ liability for abusing the company, see Chapter 7 of this
book.
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corporate veil is being pierced around the world. As other chapters in this book focus
on different aspects of abuse of companies, this chapter specifically addresses the
piercing of the corporate veil vis-à-vis shareholders.
This contribution starts with setting out the basic characteristics of veil piercing
by particularly explaining the highly divergent character of veil piercing (section
§8.02). It then turns to a typology and analysis of these types of abuse that are most
common to lead to veil piercing (section §8.03). Finally, we put forward some insights
regarding the role that legislators can play in reducing the uncertainty caused by the
concept of veil piercing.
§8.02 VEIL PIERCING: A DIVERGENT CONCEPT
[A] Denying Legal Personality Versus Denying Limited Liability
‘Veil piercing’ or ‘lifting the corporate veil’ are concepts that, in different ways, can be
found in almost all jurisdictions.3 It seems to serve as an inevitable – be it often
underdeveloped – complement to the concepts of legal personality and limited liability.
In some but highly exceptional circumstances, the legal fiction that is being created by
one of the aforementioned concepts can be set aside by a court. In that respect, a
distinction must be made between a court denying the legal personality of a legal entity
or denying the limited liability of a company’s shareholders. As veil piercing is used to
the benefit of (defrauded) creditors, their interests are considered to be best served
with a court decision that holds the shareholders (or some among them) personally
liable for the company’s debts (wholly or partially). The company itself (the legal
entity) remains in existence and can, for instance, still be put in a formal insolvency
proceeding.
The other seemingly more far-reaching option is that the court denies the entire
legal fiction of legal personality, thus treating the persons behind the corporate veil as
would there be no legal entity at all. At first sight, this option seems to differ
predominantly from the other because the legal entity is no longer existing for other
purposes, such as for instance the winding up of the entity within a formal insolvency
proceeding. In practice, however, this option proves to be particularly helpful in cases
of fraudulent asset shielding. This refers to situations in which individuals, whether or
not incorporated, defraud their creditors by shifting assets to separate legal entities,
thus avoiding that creditors of those individuals can seize their assets. By piercing the
corporate veil of the latter entities, creditors can execute their rights on the unlawfully
3. For a historical overview of the development of veil piercing see Cheng Han, W. Jiangyu, C.
Hofmann, Piercing the corporate veil: Historical, theoretical and comparative perspectives, NUS
law working paper series 2018/025, 2-10, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3254130 (accessed 11 Apr. 2019).
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shielded assets. It shows that veil piercing is a relevant technique for both limited
liability companies and partnership-type entities.4
It should further be noted that in other legal areas outside company law, multiple
companies or a company and the controlling shareholder are sometimes qualified as
one legal entity for specific duties and liabilities (usually called ‘enterprise doctrine’ or
‘economic unity doctrine’)5. This is for instance clearly the case in European compe-
tition law where the legal form is in principle irrelevant to the identification of the
enterprise concerned. This chapter focuses solely on veil piercing in company law.
[B] Diverging Incidence
Immediately after limited liability and the separate legal form became the new
standard, it was generally perceived that it comes with certain limits. It cannot be
extended beyond its reason.6 However, a straightforward theory identifying the
appropriate application of both key features is not developed. Case law filled this gap.
Nevertheless, as far as we could ascertain there are only few empirical studies
assessing the likelihood of how often courts pierce the corporate veil. Ramsay and
Noakes found that Australian courts pierced the corporate veil in 39% of the cases
where the plaintiff requested veil piercing, this percentage being lower if the share-
holders are legal entities.7 In China and the United Kingdom, court cases show higher
levels of veil piercing of more than 60%8 and almost 50% respectively,9 but in the latter
country, in 2013, the House of Lords introduced guiding principles which make veil
piercing less likely.10 American studies show veil piercing rates from 35% to 49% with
significant variety in the number of investigated cases.11
A recent empirical study assessed how readily the courts in different countries are
receptive to piercing the corporate veil. Thereto, the authors analysed 16 countries
where the law is familiar with the enterprise approach ‘a concept that allows courts to
pierce the corporate veil under the premise that a parent firm and its subsidiaries
constitute a single entity’.12 Furthermore, the scholars assessed how many factors the
court is willing to take into account for piercing the corporate veil, whether piercing the
veil is limited to insolvency or fraud and a likelihood score of veil piercing in a country
4. I.e. entities with legal personality having their own assets and debts, but in which the partners
bare unlimited liability for the debts of the partnership. The separate legal personality makes its
assets unavailable for attachment by the partners’ personal creditors.
5. K. Vandekerckhove, Piercing the corporate veil, Kluwer Law International, 381 (2007).
6. Tan Cheng Han, Veil Piercing: A Fresh Start, Journal of Business Law 20, 29 (2015).
7. Ramsay and Noakes, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Australia, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=299488 (accessed 11 Apr. 2019).
8. Hui Huang, Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: Where Is It Now and Where Is It Heading, 60
American Journal of Comparative Law 743, 746 (2012).
9. Charles Mitchell, Lifting the Corporate Veil in the English Courts: An Empirical Study, 3 Company
Financial & Insolvency Law Review 15 (1999).
10. Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd., UKSC (2013).
11. S. Belenzon, H Lee & A. Patacconi, Towards a legal theory of the firm: The effects of enterprise
liability on asset partitioning, decentralization and corporate group growth, Working Paper
NBER no. 24720, n. 130 (June 2018).
12. Ibid., p. 4.
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based upon the availability of empirical data.13 According to that study, the targeted
type of veil piercing is the least likely to happen in the UK and Sweden while courts in
Germany and Italy are more readily open to veil piercing with the United State and
China being in the middle.14
[C] Abuse of Companies Versus Abuse in Companies
Distinction should further be made between ‘abuse of companies’ and ‘abuse in
companies’. The first concept is the one which is traditionally linked with veil piercing.
A shareholder uses the corporate form and the accompanying limitation of his or her
personal liability in order to defraud creditors. When a court comes to this conclusion,
it can decide to deny either the entire legal personality of the company as such or ‘only’
the limited liability of the shareholders (compare supra). The second concept, abuse in
companies, refers to situations in which companies’ insiders (directors and/or share-
holders) behave unlawfully and for which behaviour they are held personally liable
towards third parties. This personal liability is very similar to the liability a shareholder
incurs when a court decides to pierce the corporate veil in case of abuse of a company,
but it is necessary to distinguish between both concepts.
In this chapter, we basically focus on ‘abuse of companies’, and thus not on
insiders’ personal liability towards third parties (particularly creditors) as a result of
certain unlawful or even fraudulent behaviour within a company. However, it should
be noted that although distinct, both concepts (abuse of vs. abuse in companies) are
closely intertwined and are frequently at stake at the same time. This is actually true for
all cases of ‘abuse of companies’ as abuse of the entire corporate form will inevitably
come with unlawful acts by insiders. In those cases, creditors can actually choose one
of the concepts to rely on in order to hold the insiders personally liable. The close
relationship between both concepts can probably explain why courts often do not
distinguish between them.15
§8.03 TYPES OF ABUSE THAT LEAD TO VEIL PIERCING
The existing materials on veil piercing allow us to distinguish between two main
categories of abusive situations in which courts decide to pierce the corporate veil. It
concerns [A] a factual situation in which there is complete disregarding of the
corporate form and [B] different kinds of situations of undercapitalisation of the
company.
13. This likelihood is commonly zero as empirical data are only available in the US, the UK,
Australia and China.
14. The results should be read with caution as the authors weighed the results and provided the
most weight to the enterprise approach, being the highest in Germany as the latter country
developed group law.
15. K. Vandekerckhove, Piercing the corporate veil, Kluwer Law International, 12 (2007).
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[A] Disregarding of the Corporate Form
[1] Introduction
A first category of situations that can lead to veil piercing can be labelled as
‘disregarding of the corporate form’. This concept broadly refers to situations in which
a company has no real separate existence from its shareholder, being only but a ‘shield’
behind which shareholders hide.
A company is a separate legal person, independent from its shareholders, which
can be granted the benefit of limited liability. However, in certain circumstances,
shareholders can wrongfully dominate the company in their sole interest and to the
detriment of creditors. In those circumstances, courts sometimes lift the corporate veil,
particularly when they find that the company and its shareholder(s) need to be
assimilated and thus to be considered as one person because they are too intermingled,
and therefore the shareholders should not benefit from the advantage of limited
liability related to the legal form.
[2] The US Approach
[a] Overview
Compared with other jurisdictions, in the US, veil piercing is well studied and reported.
According to these studies, courts frequently pierce the corporate veil when they
conclude that a company is a mere ‘agent’, ‘instrumentality’, ‘alter ego’, ‘dummy’ or
‘shell’ for its shareholders. In his 1991 empirical research, Professor Thompson found
that in ‘successful’ veil piercing cases one or more of these elements were almost
always mentioned by the courts.16 The underlying idea is that when a company has no
distinct existence or identity from the dominating shareholders, the company can be
used in the sole advantage of the shareholders at the expense of third parties.17
The mere fact, however, that a corporation is controlled and dominated by a
shareholder does not suffice to conclude that the corporate veil should be pierced. This
would undermine the whole purpose and benefit of limited liability.18 Especially in
single member companies or other close corporations with a small number of share-
holders, it is quite unrealistic to suppose that the corporate purpose would substan-
tially differ from the interests of the dominating shareholder.19 In most states, it is
16. R. B. Thompson, Piercing the corporate veil: an empirical study, 76 Cornell L. Rev., (1036) 1064
(1991).
17. D. Millon, Piercing the corporate veil, Financial responsibility, and the limits of limited liability,
Washington & Lee public studies research paper series, Working paper 2006-08, 21, https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=932959 (accessed 11 Apr. 2019).
18. S. Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, Limited liability: A legal and economic analysis, Elgar
Publishing, 92 (2016).
19. D. Millon, Piercing the corporate veil, Financial responsibility, and the limits of limited liability,
Washington & Lee public studies research paper series, Working paper 2006-08, 23, https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=932959 (accessed 11 Apr. 2019).
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therefore acknowledged that even the fact that a corporation is a mere alter ego of the
individual shareholder does not suffice to conclude to veil piercing.20
Traditionally, US veil piercing theory in this respect distinguishes between three
different doctrines: the ‘instrumentality’, the ‘alter ego’ and the ‘identity’ doctrine.
However, in our view, these theories do not differ substantially from each other, and
share identical key elements.21 Summarised, proof is required that ‘(1) the defendant
shareholder dominated and controlled the corporation and that (2) the defendant
abused that control by committing fraud, illegality, or some other form of injustice’.22
[b] A Two-Pronged Test
For the first stage of the two-pronged test (the proof that the company is dominated),
courts take multiple factors into consideration. In fact, long ‘laundry lists’ of factors are
frequently used in the assessment of domination. Some of the important examples are:
(1) the commingling of funds and assets
(2) the treatment of the company’s assets for personal purposes, or
(3) a failure to maintain minutes or corporate records.23
The assessment will always require a case by case analysis, and because the different
factors taken into consideration by the courts are unweighted, it is hard to determine
which exact factors are decisive.24 It should be noted that the factors which courts cite
go well beyond the normal control of the company ways of ‘controlling’ and ‘domi-
nating’ a company, which is typical for majority shareholders. In fact, even without
considering the second step in the two-pronged test, this behaviour of the dominant
shareholder is unlawful from an internal perspective (abuse in companies). Although
these acts are already unlawful by themselves (for example, siphoning assets out of a
company in breach of the rules on profit distributions), this is not considered sufficient
to conclude to veil piercing.
An example of how courts approach veil piercing can be found in the following
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source:
The first and most striking feature that emerges from our examination of the record
is that these corporate defendants are, indeed, little but Marchese’s playthings.
Marchese is the sole shareholder of PS, Caribe Crown, Jamar, and Salescaster. He
is one of the two shareholders of Tie-Net. Except for Tie-Net, none of the
corporations ever held a single corporate meeting. (At the handful of Tie-Net
meetings held by Marchese and Andre, no minutes were taken.) During his
deposition, Marchese did not remember any of these corporations ever passing
20. S. Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, Limited liability: A legal and economic analysis, Elgar
Publishing, 91 (2016).
21. P. I. Blumberg, The law of corporate groups, 111 (1987).
22. S. Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, Limited liability: A legal and economic analysis, Elgar
Publishing, 103 (2016).
23. Ibid., 106.
24. D. Millon, Piercing the corporate veil, Financial responsibility, and the limits of limited liability,
Washington & Lee public studies research paper series, Working paper 2006-08, 20, https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=932959 (accessed 11 Apr. 2019).
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articles of incorporation, bylaws, or other agreements. As for physical facilities,
Marchese runs all of these corporations (including Tie-Net) out of the same, single
office, with the same phone line, the same expense accounts, and the like. And
how he does “run” the expense accounts! When he fancies to, Marchese “bor-
rows” substantial sums of money from these corporations - interest free, of course.
The corporations also “borrow” money from each other when need be, which left
at least PS completely out of capital when the Sea-Land bills came due. What’s
more, Marchese has used the bank accounts of these corporations to pay all kinds
of personal expenses, including alimony and child support payments to his
ex-wife, education expenses for his children, maintenance of his personal auto-
mobiles, health care for his pet - the list goes on and on. Marchese did not even
have a personal bank account! (With “corporate” accounts like these, who needs
one?).25
The failure to observe corporate formalities is frequently mentioned as a reason to
pierce the corporate veil.26 For example, when no general meeting is held, no board of
directors is appointed, or when decision making is never documented by board notes,
this may indicate that the corporation is merely fictional. However, authors rightfully
state that even when corporate formalities are severely neglected, this sole fact can
doubtfully be a sufficient basis for veil piercing.27 There is no necessary causal link
between the failure to keep up corporate formalities and a creditor’s damage.28
Nevertheless, Thompson’s empirical research showed that the failure to keep corporate
formalities was mentioned in two-thirds of successful veil piercing cases, and in more
than 90% of unsuccessful piercing cases.29 Other empirical research confirms these
findings.30
As already mentioned, mere proof of these elements will not suffice for a
successful veil piercing claim as there is a second step to take. Proof of ‘fraud, illegality
or some other injustice’ is necessary. The mere fact that a creditor’s claim against the
company is unsatisfied is insufficient in that respect as this would be the case with
every veil piercing claim.31 In the case quoted earlier, the US Seventh Circuit held that
the additional ‘wrongful element’ was not proven by the trial court because the
decision was only motivated on the ground that due to the limited liability, the
companies’ creditor would be denied a full judicially-imposed recovery.
25. 941 F.2d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 1991).
26. R. B. Thompson, Piercing the corporate veil: an empirical study, 76 Cornell L. Rev., (1036)
1067(1991); D. Millon, Piercing the corporate veil, Financial responsibility, and the limits of
limited liability, Washington & Lee public studies research paper series, Working paper 2006-08,
25, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=932959 (accessed 11 Apr. 2019).
27. D. Millon, Piercing the corporate veil, Financial responsibility, and the limits of limited liability,
Washington & Lee public studies research paper series, Working paper 2006-08, 25, https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=932959 (accessed 11 Apr. 2019).
28. S. Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, Limited liability: A legal and economic analysis, Elgar
Publishing, 109 (2016).
29. R. B. Thompson, Piercing the corporate veil: an empirical study, 76 Cornell L. Rev., (1036) 1064
and 1065, n. 141 (1991).
30. P. B. Oh, Veil piercing, Texas Law review, (81) 133 (2010).
31. S. Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, Limited liability: A legal and economic analysis, Elgar
Publishing, 113 (2016).
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On remand, the court should require that Sea-Land produce, if it desires summary
judgment, evidence and argument that would establish the kind of additional
“wrong” present in the above cases. For example, perhaps Sea-Land could
establish that Marchese, like Roth in Van Dorn, used these corporate facades to
avoid its responsibilities to creditors; or that PS, Marchese, or one of the other
corporations will be “unjustly enriched” unless liability is shared by all. Of course,
Sea-Land is not required fully to prove intent to defraud, which it probably could
not do on summary judgment anyway. But it is required to show the kind of
injustice to merit the evocation of the court’s essentially equitable power to
prevent “injustice.” It may well be that, after more of such evidence is adduced, no
genuine issue of fact exists to prevent Sea-Land from reaching Marchese’s other
pet corporations for PS’s debt. Or it may be that only a finder of fact will be able to
determine whether fraud or “injustice” is involved here. In any event, the record
as it currently stands is insufficient to uphold the entry of summary judgment.32
As illustrated, the required proof of an additional ‘wrong’ or fraud next to domination
is a barrier to a successful veil piercing claim. Fraud is generally used in a broad sense,
as ‘bad faith’ or ‘unfairness’, but these vague terms do not give any further clarification
on this matter.33 It is difficult to determine the real decisive factors that courts take into
consideration in this second stage of the two-pronged test, which can be seen as the
most important cause of the vagueness of the US veil piercing doctrine.34
In this respect Macey and Mitts conclude:
Scholars often claim that the inquiry into whether the corporate form should be
disregarded has become oddly separated from the question of why the corporate
form should be disregarded. In particular, the generic justifications such as
undercapitalization, failure to observe corporate formalities, and preventing injus-
tice offered to justify piercing are unpersuasive because they are either complete
non sequiturs or vacuous due to the fact that they are wholly conclusory.35
Bainbridge and Henderson argue that courts give:
ex-post rationalizations of a conclusion reached on grounds that are often unar-
ticulated.36
Summarised, veil piercing is a vague concept, and the exact criteria on which US courts
base their piercing decisions are rather hard to structure. When it comes to veil piercing
because of disregarding of the corporate form, it is clear, however, that courts first
make an analysis whether a shareholder dominated the company and conducted
business with it disregarding the corporate form (such as asset commingling or absence
32. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1991).
33. D. Millon, Piercing the corporate veil, Financial responsibility, and the limits of limited liability,
Washington & Lee public studies research paper series, Working paper 2006-08, 24, https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=932959 (accessed 11 Apr. 2019).
34. H. Hansmann, R. Squire, External and internal asset partitioning: corporations and subsidiaries
in J.N. Gordon, W-G. Ringe, The Oxford handbook of corporate law and governance, (251) 269
(2018).
35. J. Macey, J. Mitts, Finding order in the morass: the three real justifications for piercing the
corporate veil, Cornell law review, (99) 152 (2014).
36. S. Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, Limited liability: A legal and economic analysis, Elgar
Publishing, 111 (2016).
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of corporate formalities). Subsequently, proof of fraud or injustice is required. This
second step makes clear that in order to trigger veil piercing, more than violations
against the corporate form are required, and a certain intentional element must be at
hand. The latter is particularly responsible for the vagueness that is traditionally
associated with the veil piercing concept. It should be noted that the US two-pronged
test clearly illustrates the distinction between abuse in and abuse of companies as
mentioned earlier. When shareholders violate the corporate form (the first step in the
test), there is abuse in the company. However, the US doctrine on veil piercing requires
more to lift the corporate veil. Proof of fraud or injustice must be provided to consider
it abuse of the corporate form, and so to justify the ultimate remedy of veil piercing.
[3] Continental European Experiences
Veil piercing on grounds of disregarding of the corporate form is not limited to the US.
The ‘laundry list’ approach to determine whether a shareholder wrongly dominated the
company can also be found in other jurisdictions. For example, Belgian and French
doctrine also list factors as the absence of corporate bookkeeping, the intermingling of
bank accounts, payment of private expenses by the company, absence of corporate
formalities, etc., as indications of abuse of legal personality that can justify veil
piercing.37 Piercing decisions are rare, however, and will only take place in extreme
situations when shareholders clearly neglect to act in the interest of their company and
thereby harm creditors.
Asset commingling serves as a good example. It is a predominant element in veil
piercing decisions and refers to the situation where assets of the company are used by
shareholders for personal use and vice versa. In many continental European countries,
courts use the presence of asset commingling for justifying veil piercing. However, not
every situation of asset comingling can justify a veil piercing claim. We illustrate with
examples from Germany, France and Belgium.
The German Supreme Court, the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), acknowledged that
veil piercing (‘Durchgriffshaftung’) is an appropriate remedy when the assets of the
company and the shareholder(s) are indistinguishably intermingled.38 This is only
allowed, however, in extreme circumstances when normal restitution mechanisms
cannot be applied because of the complete disorganisation of the company’s adminis-
tration, and not for the general sanctioning of bookkeeping irregularities. Veil piercing
is, for instance, only supported when the lack of transparency caused by improper
accounting makes it impossible for third parties to attribute transactions to the
company, and it is only applicable to the responsible shareholders who misused their
37. M. Cozian, A. Viandier, F. Deboissy, Droit des sociétés, Paris, Lexisnexis, 86, no 185 (2016); K.
Vandekerckhove, Piercing the corporate veil, Kluwer Law International, 387 and 435 (2007); V.
Simonart, La personnalité morale en droit privé comparé, 478-481, no 550 (1995).
38. BGH II ZR 178/03, Nov. 14., 2005, 2006 NZG 350.
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influence.39 Moreover, in 2007, the BGH changed its ‘Durchgriffshaftung’ doctrine to
the concept of ‘existenzvernichtenden Eingriffs’ by stating that shareholders, when they
intentionally endangered the company through unlawful behaviour, can only be held
liable on a tort basis (abuse in the company).40 However, the BGH explicitly pointed
out that in the case of asset commingling, veil piercing based on Durchgriffshaftung
(abuse of the company) remains applicable.41
Compared to the US, the German approach does not involve a two-pronged test.
German law rather stresses the concept of subsidiarity. Intentionally defrauding
creditors is not the central requirement. Veil piercing is rather seen as the ultimum
remedium for those cases where no other remedies (general principles of law or explicit
statutory provisions) are available to creditors.42
In France too, asset commingling is seen as an element that can lead to the
assimilation between the shareholder(s) and the company. French doctrine interest-
ingly uses the concept of the ‘société fictive’ (fictional company), the situation where a
company was founded without any ‘affectio societatis’. This is a rather ambiguous
concept used to describe whether the founders truly wanted to work together in a
company and undertake an economic activity.43 However, when the company is a
mere cover for a shareholder to hide, the company lacks this consent from the
shareholders and is purely fictional.44 When the only purpose of the company was to
limit the creditor’s recourse, the use of the company constitutes an abuse.45 The use of
a concept such as ‘affectio societatis’ puts forward the intentional element, resembling
the second step from the American veil piercing test (the proof of a fraud or wrong).
French legal doctrine argues that asset commingling is a different legal concept
than a purely fictional company because asset commingling constitutes a wrong
committed by directors that may lead to their responsibility (an abuse in the com-
pany).46 However, courts frequently use both concepts without clear distinction and
with the same consequences, making asset commingling a determining factor to
ascertain whether the company has any real existence.47
In Belgium, it is accepted in legal literature that the corporate veil can be pierced
when essential rules of company law are severely violated, especially when the
39. Ibid., par. 17; T. Cheng Han, W. Jiangyu, C. Hofmann, Piercing the corporate veil: Historical,
theoretical and comparative perspectives, NUS law working paper series 2018/025, 39, https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3254130 (accessed 11 Apr. 2019).
40. BGH 16 July 2007, II ZR 3/04 (Trihotel).
41. Ibid., par. 27; T. Cheng Han, W. Jiangyu, C. Hofmann, Piercing the corporate veil: Historical,
theoretical and comparative perspectives, NUS law working paper series 2018/025, 41, https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3254130 (accessed 11 Apr. 2019).
42. Ibid.
43. M. Cozian, A. Viandier, F. Deboissy, Droit des sociétés, 29e édition, Lexisnexis, 81, no 173
(2016).
44. M. Cozian, A. Viandier, F. Deboissy, Droit des sociétés, 29e édition, Lexisnexis, 82, no 175
(2016). For an example: Cass. Com. 9 June 2009, Rev. Sociétés 2009, 781, note N. Mathey.
45. J.-J. Daigre, ‘‘Société fictive”, Rép. dr. soc., no 18.
46. J.-J. Daigre, ‘‘Société fictive”, Rép. dr. soc., no 25.
47. I. Tchotoutian, Vers une définition de l’affectio societatis lors de la constitution d’une société,
L.G.D.J, 202, no 336 (2011); J.-J. Daigre, Société fictive, Rép. dr. soc., 25-28.
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company has no proper management and when the personal assets of the sharehold-
ers’ and those of the company are intermingled.48 Veil piercing is only allowed if
shareholders manifestly abused the company, having no respect of its separate
existence making it only a cover for the shareholders’ own activities. In that respect,
similarly to German law, judicial veil piercing is seen as an ‘ultimum remedium’ to
resolve cases where statutory rules fall short.49 Shareholders cannot be allowed to
invoke the benefits of the institution of limited liability when they have not respected
the rules related to it; in that case, they can be seen to have forfeited the right to enjoy
limited liability.50 Proof of an intentional element or fraud is, however, not generally
required. It should be mentioned that although veil piercing was frequently invoked




The second category of situations that may lead to veil piercing concerns undercapi-
talisation. In the context of this chapter, undercapitalisation is used in a broad sense
covering different situations in which shareholders have made insufficient investments
in their company to let it operate properly. Undercapitalisation is potentially highly
detrimental to the interests of creditors as in those cases, creditors actually bear the
ultimate business and insolvency risk of the company instead of the shareholders.51
Therefore, undercapitalisation can be qualified as one of the basic types of abuse of
companies with limited liability. Similar to cases of disregarding of the corporate form
(supra), in many jurisdictions veil piercing serves as the ultimate sanctioning mecha-
nism in case of this type of abusive use of limited liability companies.
Undercapitalisation can be at stake at all stages of the corporate lifecycle. Most
clear is the case for denying limited liability where the undercapitalisation is the result
of shareholders actively shifting assets out of their company (asset stripping). Alter-
natively, undercapitalisation can be present already at the time of a company’s
formation, in which case a company is being set-up while it is, from the onset, deemed
to go bankrupt. Finally, when a company continues its operations behind the moment
on which it should have been clear that insolvency was inevitable, undercapitalisation
will be at stake too. However, undercapitalisation does not always lead to veil piercing
as additional conditions must be fulfilled.
48. E. Dirix, R. Steennot, H. Vanhees, Handels- en economisch recht in hoofdlijnen, Antwerpen,
Intersentia, 48 (2014); K. Geens, M. Wyckaert, De Vennootschap - Algemeen deel in Beginselen
van het Belgisch Privaatrecht, Kluwer, 342 (2011).
49. K. Vandekerckhove, Piercing the corporate veil, Kluwer Law International, 33 (2007).
50. Ibid.; K. Geens, M. Wyckaert, De Vennootschap - Algemeen deel in Beginselen van het Belgisch
Privaatrecht, Kluwer, 342 (2011).
51. P. Davies, Directors’ creditor-regarding duties in respect of trading decisions taken in the vicinity
of insolvency, European Business Organization Law Review, (301) 306 (2006).
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Beyond disregarding of the corporate form, directors may also in some way be
involved in and bear the responsibility for the undercapitalisation of their company.
Moreover, several specific cases of undercapitalisation were identified by the legisla-
tors in many countries, leading to statutory rules defining shareholders’ and/or
directors’ liability in certain cases in this respect. This clearly reduces vagueness and
uncertainty compared to veil piercing in case of disregarding of the corporate form.
However, it makes the picture more complex, particularly from a legal comparative
perspective, as questions arise as to who can be held liable, whether separate or joint
liability exists, and to which amounts.
[2] Asset Stripping
A straightforward example of undercapitalisation that can be considered abuse of the
corporate form and therefore lead to veil piercing is when shareholders unlawfully take
assets out of the company and leave the company ‘undercapitalised’ behind. This
behaviour deteriorates creditors’ chances of full repayment.
Asset stripping can be analysed in different ways. First of all, particularly in a US
context,52 it could be seen as a case of disregarding the corporate form rather than a
case of undercapitalisation. Asset stripping will frequently coincide with commingling
of assets. Shareholders use the company’s assets for their own benefit, thus neglecting
the separate legal personality of their company. As previously explained, ‘commingling
of assets’ figures on the laundry list of situations that may lead to the conclusion that
the corporate form is disregarded, which in its turn may lead to veil piercing (compare
supra §8.03[A][2][ii]).
In a continental setting, asset stripping (which leaves the company undercapit-
alised) is mostly analysed in the context of distributions to shareholders. A good
example in that respect can be found in the Netherlands. In multiple cases, the Dutch
Supreme Court acknowledged that shareholders can be held personally liable in case of
asset stripping.
Most famous is the Nimox case.53 In this case, the sole shareholder of a company
decided to pay out a substantive dividend. This decision was taken with respect of the
Dutch statutory rules on profit distributions at that time54 as the dividend was entirely
paid out of distributable reserves. Shortly after the payment of dividend, the company
went bankrupt. It had suffered losses for several years, including the year in which the
distribution took place. The shareholder was held liable because it had not considered
the possibility that the continuation of the company’s activities could be endangered by
the distribution of dividend. Importantly, the court stated that the statutory distribution
rules are not the only rules that need to be taken into account when deciding on
52. See, e.g., S. Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, Limited liability: A legal and economic analysis,
Elgar Publishing, 108 (2016); J. Macey, J. Mitts, Finding order in the morass: the three real
justifications for piercing the corporate veil, Cornell law review, (99) 107 (2014).
53. Hoge Raad 8 Nov. 1991, NJ, 174.
54. See Art. 15 Second Directive of 13 Dec. 1976 (Capital Directive) (77/91/EEC).
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dividends, but also the general duty of care. The essential element leading to share-
holder liability seems to be that the shareholders are responsible for shifting excessive
risks towards the company’s creditors by not taking into account the possibility of a
deficit or discontinuation of the company when reducing the assets of the company.55
It should be noted that according to Dutch jurisprudence, asset stripping leads to
shareholder liability, which is distinct from real veil piercing. In the Netherlands,
‘‘direct’’ veil piercing, by which limited liability or even legal personality is being
entirely set aside, is not or hardly recognised by the courts.56 ‘Direct’ veil piercing can
only be used as an ‘ultimum remedium’. Situations where ‘direct’ piercing would be
appropriate are when tort claims would provide no recourse, for example in the context
of groups of companies where the assets of the individual companies are completely
commingled.57 This underlines the link between undercapitalisation and disregarding
of the corporate form as grounds for veil piercing. The main difference between veil
piercing and shareholder liability lies in the amount of damages that can be due.58 In
the former case, the shareholder is liable for all debts of the company. In the latter case,
the shareholder can only be held liable for the actual damage caused by his or her
fraudulent act.59
The German BGH follows a very similar approach. Shareholders can be held
liable for ‘existenzvernichtenden Eingriffs’, for example in case of unauthorised distri-
butions of the company’s assets, or the misuse of corporate assets for personal purpose,
or transactions with shareholders that are not at arm’s length. In its 2007 Trihotel case,
the court made clear that claims for ‘existenzvernichtenden Eingriffs’ need to be
handled on a tort basis (compare supra §8.3[A][3]).60 Before the Trihotel case, the
court used a different approach, called ‘Durchgriffshaftung’, which is to be understood
as direct veil piercing.61 After the Trihotel case, the latter concept can only be invoked
in a very limited number of cases not covered by the theory on ‘existenzvernichtenden
Eingriffs’.62
55. J. Barneveld, Financiering en vermogensonttrekking door aandeelhouders, Deventer, Kluwer,
483 (2014).
56. Asser/Maeijer/Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2-II 2009, 1068, no 836.
57. M.L. Lennarts, Concernaansprakelijkheid, Deventer, Kluwer, 243 (1999).
58. Hoge Raad 13 oktober 2000, Rainbow products/ontvanger, 698 (NJ 2000); J. Barneveld,
Financiering en vermogensonttrekking door aandeelhouders, Deventer, Kluwer, 471 (2014).
59. J. M.M. Maeijer, comment on Hoge Raad 13 oktober 2000, (698) p. 16 (NJ 2000). E.g., in the case
of asset stripping, the fact that certain assets were withdrawn from the company is not
necessarily the cause for the bankruptcy, and correspondingly, shareholders are not necessarily
responsible for the whole net loss of the company. When the asset stripping itself caused the
bankruptcy, the situation is different.
60. BGH 16 July 2007, II ZR 3/04 (Trihotel).
61. BGH 24 June 2002, II ZR 300/00 (KBV).
62. T. Cheng Han, W. Jiangyu, C. Hofmann, Piercing the corporate veil: Historical, theoretical and
comparative perspectives, NUS law working paper series 2018/025, 41, https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3254130 (accessed 11 Apr. 2019).
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[3] Undercapitalisation upon Formation
Undercapitalisation can be present from the moment of establishment of the company,
that is when it is being set-up and the founders know or should have known that the
lack of financing for the planned activities would result in bankruptcy. Remarkably,
only a few jurisdictions explicitly recognise this phenomenon. This is particularly the
case in Belgium, where statutory rules exist with regard to the liability of founders in
case of inadequate funding of a company at the time of its formation.
If a company goes bankrupt within three years of its formation, the founding
shareholders can be held jointly liable when it is established that the start-up capital
was manifestly insufficient for the normal operation of the business for two years
consequent to its formation.63 When it is proven that the company was undercapital-
ised upon formation, the founders are liable for the net loss of the company. Proof that
the undercapitalisation upon formation led to bankruptcy, or proof of a fault as such
are not necessary.64 The personal liability does only apply to the founding sharehold-
ers.
When establishing a company, the founders need to draw up a financial plan. In
this financial plan, the founders need to outline and determine the financial needs of
their company sufficient for its operational activities during the first two years. In case
of bankruptcy, the court will investigate this financial plan for determining whether the
company was undercapitalised at the time of its formation if the appointed liquidator
requests to. The founders can only be held liable if the total initial financing of the
company was manifestly inadequate.65
Even if the statutory conditions are not fulfilled, for example when bankruptcy
occurs later than three years after the incorporation, the majority of the Belgian
doctrine accepts that common tort rules can still be invoked to hold a shareholder liable
63. Art. 229, 5° Belgian Company Code. The notion ‘capital’ can be misleading, since not only
equity, but also other financial resources (such as shareholder loans, external credit or
subsidies) must be taken into account. P. Coussement, M. Tison, Oprichteraansprakelijkheid in
Bestendig Handboek Vennootschap & Aansprakelijkheid, afl. 4, 58, no 4100 (2003).
64. H. Braeckmans, R. Houben, Handboek Vennootschapsrecht, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 548, no
1010 (2011).
65. The original financial assessments from the financial plan are subject to a marginal appreciation
by the court that must take the perspective of the time of incorporation with the information that
was available at that time. The capital is considered to be manifestly insufficient when this
should have been clear to every reasonable person (in this context, any reasonable founder). In
principle, the fact that the insolvency was caused by external factors (e.g., insolvency of a major
client or a total market collapse) is not relevant if the courts find that the company was
manifestly undercapitalised. However, external factors can liberate the founders from liability
when those external elements were not foreseeable at the time of incorporation. P. Coussement,
M. Tison, Oprichteraansprakelijkheid in Bestendig Handboek Vennootschap & Aansprakelijk-
heid, afl. 4, 55, nrs. 4086 and 4108 (2003).
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for the undercapitalisation upon formation of the company.66 However, it will be much
harder to hold a shareholder accountable.67
These explicit statutory rules concerning the adequate financing upon formation
of the company contrast with other jurisdictions. However, the fact that shareholders
need to provide sufficient funds is not unique. In the Netherlands, for example, it is
accepted that a company must be adequately funded upon formation, and that
shareholders can be held liable when undercapitalisation is apparent.68
[4] Undercapitalisation in Other Stages of the Corporate Lifecycle
Can undercapitalisation be at stake in other situations besides the company’s forma-
tion and cases of asset stripping? Of course. At any time in the corporate lifecycle, a
company can experience the absence of insufficient means which may prevent it from
operating properly.
Although frequently cited in veil piercing cases,69 US doctrine generally acknowl-
edges that undercapitalisation is, in itself, insufficient to justify veil piercing.70 Argu-
ments put forward for considering undercapitalisation being insufficient are, inter alia,
the fear for hindsight bias in combination with the risk of requiring too much capital as
66. H. De Wulf, Concernaansprakelijkheid in Bestendig Handboek Vennootschap & Aansprakelijk-
heid, afl. 3, 98 (2002); K. Vandekerckhove, Piercing the corporate veil, Kluwer Law International,
118 (2007).
67. Because proof is needed of (1) a fault (the undercapitalisation), (2) damage and (3) a causal link.
This option is in practice, however, not so often used by the courts; K. Vandekerckhove, Piercing
the corporate veil, Kluwer Law International, 120 (2007).
68. C. Asser, G. Van Solinge en M.P. Nieuwe Weme, Rechtspersonenrecht: NV en BV Oprichting,
vermogen en aandelen, in Mr C. Assers Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands
Burgerlijk recht, Deventer, Kluwer, 174-175 (2013); J. Barneveld, Financiering en vermogensont-
trekking door aandeelhouders, Deventer, Kluwer, 505 (2014).
69. R.B. Thompson, Piercing the corporate veil: an empirical study, 76 Cornell L. Rev., (1036) 1065
(1991).
70. See for instance Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966); S. Bainbridge, M. Todd
Henderson, Limited liability: A legal and economic analysis, Elgar Publishing, 128 (2016); J.
Macey, J. Mitts, Finding order in the morass: the three real justifications for piercing the corporate
veil, Cornell Law Review, (99) 15 (2014). In the famous Walkovsky v. Carlton case, Mr
Walkovsky was severely injured when he was run down by a taxicab company owned by Mr
Carlton. The company had no other assets than the cab and only the minimum automobile
liability insurance required by law (in the amount of USD 10,000) was carried on the cab. Mr
Carlton had many of these ‘cab companies’ that allegedly were operated as a single entity. Mr
Walkovsky requested the personal liability of the shareholders for his damages. The court held
that his claim was inadequately stating a cause of action. However, Judge Keating had a
dissenting opinion and stated that ‘a participating shareholder of a corporation vested with a
public interest, organised with capital insufficient to meet liabilities which are certain to arise in
the ordinary course of the corporation’s business, may be held personally responsible for such
liabilities’.
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a precaution.71 Moreover, openly holding shareholders liable in all cases of undercapi-
talisation would completely contradict the idea of limited liability.72
It is generally accepted that shareholders do not have a duty to make additional
investments in their companies when the company is running out of money to manage
its business properly, so this cannot lead to veil piercing. On the other hand,
shareholders and their agents are at any time supposed to act with an appropriate level
of care. As long as the company is in going concern and is not suffering from financial
difficulties, this has no direct implications with regard to creditors, except in cases of
asset stripping (compare supra §8.03[B][2]). This picture completely changes, how-
ever, when a company is on the vicinity of insolvency as at that moment creditors
become the ultimate risk bearers.73 At that point, the company’s agents should take the
interests of the creditors into account to act according to the proper standard of care. If
they do not and continue the company’s operations beyond the point where it is clear
that the company is deemed to go bankrupt, undercapitalisation constitutes an abuse
of limited liability. Limited liability is used to gamble for resurrection or for other
purposes, to the clear detriment of creditors.
Continuing a limited liability company beyond the point at which it is clear that
insolvency is unavoidable can be considered a case of abusive undercapitalisation that
might lead to veil piercing. Given the importance and frequency of these types of
situations, most jurisdictions developed more detailed and nuanced rules in this
respect, whether through statutory law or through jurisprudence.74 Reference can be
made to the UK rules on wrongful trading,75 the German rules on the timely filing of
insolvency procedures,76 or the French ‘action en comblement de passif’.77
It should be noted that in developing these more specific rules, legislators and
courts expressly shift liability for these situations of wrongful undercapitalisation from
the shareholders to their agents, the directors. In closed corporations, however,
directors and shareholders will often be the same individuals. Moreover, in most
71. S. Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, Limited liability: A legal and economic analysis, Elgar
Publishing, 127 (2016).
72. D. Millon, Piercing the corporate veil, Financial responsibility, and the limits of limited liability,
Washington & Lee public studies research paper series, Working paper 2006-08, 28, https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=932959 (accessed 11 Apr. 2019).
73. P. Davies, Directors’ creditor-regarding duties in respect of trading decisions taken in the vicinity
of insolvency, (301) 306 (EBOR 2006).
74. See for an overview S. Kalss, N. Adensamer & J. Oelkers, Director’s duties in the vicinity of
insolvency – a comparative analysis with reports from Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
England, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden in M. LUTTER
(ed.), Legal Capital in Europe, ECFR Special Volume 1, 112-143 (2006).
75. S. 214 Insolvency Act 1986.
76. § 15(a)1 Insolvenzverordnung; see for a comparison between the UK and the German approach
T. Bachner, Creditor protection in private companies: Anglo-German perspectives for a European
legal discourse, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 180-247 (2009).
77. Art. L651-2 Code de commerce. See in that respect, e.g., M. Cozian, A. Viandier, F. Deboissy,
Droit des sociétés, Paris, Lexisnexis, 191, no 391 et seq. Historically, Belgium has a similar
liability rule, but an additional UK-style of wrongful trading rules has been introduced recently
(2018), see Art. XX.227 of the Belgian Code of Economic Law.
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jurisdictions, liability also applies to shadow directors and de facto directors,78 which,
in many cases, will lead to a situation very similar to veil piercing. A company’s
dominating insider is being held personally liable for – at least a part of – the company’s
debts.
[C] Intermediary Conclusion
The possibility to pierce the corporate veil can be seen as an essential attribute of the
concepts of legal personality and limited liability. In those cases where the essential
characteristics of these concepts are being abused to the detriment of third parties, it is
deemed appropriate that they can be set aside.
Veil piercing is a severe sanction which can have a positive deterring effect, but
adds an important level of uncertainty to the crucial concept of limited liability too.
Consequently, courts worldwide seem to be highly reluctant to conclude to veil
piercing. We identified two main categories of situations in which veil piercing claims
can be successful: non-observance of the corporate form, and undercapitalisation. The
former referring to abuse of the entire concept of legal personality, and the latter more
specifically directed to abuse of the feature of limited liability.
What became clear is that mere situations of absence of capital, undercapitalisa-
tion or lack of complying with corporate formalities never suffice to conclude to veil
piercing. Additional elements are required, whether it is proof of an intention to
defraud creditors, specific circumstances (insolvency) or the intentional inactivity of
corporate incumbents and shareholders. According to the jurisdiction at stake, these
additional elements are quite divergent, but have in common that they add a certain
level of vagueness to the concept of veil piercing.
Another downside of veil piercing, besides this ambiguity of the applicable
criteria, is its boldness. In its most severe version, the entire construction of legal
personality is being set aside. It results in the refusal of belief in the company itself and
the latter cannot longer be subjected to other statutory rules or procedures. Even if
lifting the veil only leads to the denial of limited liability, instead of the rejection of legal
personality as such, the results are outspoken. In cases where several shareholders
with different positions or even other insiders were involved, this may be problematic.
The uncertainty, vagueness and bold character of veil piercing seem to have
brought many legislators to develop statutory rules with regard to situations which are
traditionally seen as abusive situations that could lead to veil piercing, particularly with
regard to undercapitalisation. Moreover, in some jurisdictions also the highest courts
seem to prefer to develop alternative, more nuanced theories to hold shareholders
liable based on tort rather than applying veil piercing. In that respect, reference can
particularly be made to the above-mentioned evolutions in Germany and the Nether-
lands.79
78. See for the difference between both concepts, e.g., A. Keay, Company directors’ responsibilities
to creditors, Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish, 8 (2007); P. Davies, Directors’ creditor-regarding
duties in respect of trading decisions taken in the vicinity of insolvency, (301) 312 (EBOR 2006).
79. Supra §8.3[B][2].
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§8.04 ABUSE OF COMPANIES, VEIL PIERCING AND THE ROLE OF
STATUTORY LAW
As established in the preceding paragraphs, in most jurisdictions, regarding abuse of
the essential characteristics of a company, a complex but interesting combination
coexists of statutory rules, jurisdictional rules on shareholder responsibility, often
based on tort, and finally the jurisdictional concept of veil piercing. From a policy
perspective, an important question in this respect is whether an optimal combination
and equilibrium between these different approaches can be developed.
The approach based on statutory rules has the advantage to provide more legal
certainty. It makes the work of courts and liquidators easier, and it allows nuance and
specification. Particularly, it allows allocating liability more adequately. Examples
illustrating this approach relate, i.a., to asset stripping. Almost all jurisdictions have
rules on profit distributions80 and accompanying liability rules for both directors and
shareholders.81 The same applies to undercapitalisation in the vicinity of insolvency, a
situation that legislators worldwide have scrutinised, whether it be through rules on
wrongful trading targeted at directors and shadow directors, whether through insol-
vency filing duties, or whether through US-style fraudulent transfer rules.82 Also, many
situations that are traditionally associated with non-observance of the corporate form
are targeted by statutory rules. Many jurisdictions have express provisions on –
sometimes even criminal – liability for neglecting the rules on corporate bookkeeping
or the improper use of corporate assets.83
The appropriateness of the latter statutory rules leading to the conclusion of
non-observance of the corporate form for solving all specific situations can be
questioned.84 There is room for the proper role of veil piercing doctrine. In some cases,
the application of the statutory rules will not lead to a useful result, for instance,
because the director who is being held liable is insolvent or because it is hard to proof
the causal link between the unlawful behaviour and the injury of the creditors. In those
situations, veil piercing is a helpful instrument. When a creditor or liquidator can prove
that the essential features of the company are being abused in order to defraud
creditors, irrespective of whether (other) statutory rules are being respected, courts
should be able to pierce the corporate veil and thus to set aside the entire legal fiction
of limited liability and/or legal personality. However, veil piercing should remain an
extraordinary measure for extraordinary circumstances and only serve as an ultimate
backstop.
Statutory rules on abusive practices and veil piercing doctrine can and should
coexist. The better those statutory rules are designed and applied in a certain
80. Whether it be balance sheet test or solvency test-based rules or a combination of both; see, e.g.,
W. Schön, Balance sheet tests or solvency tests – or both?, 181-198 (EBOR 2006).
81. See, e.g., Art. 2:216 par. 3 of the Dutch Civil Code or Art. 263 of the Belgian Companies Code.
82. See in this respect, e.g., § 548 of the US Bankruptcy Code.
83. See, e.g., the French rules concerning L’abus de biens sociaux (art. L241-3 Code de commerce).
84. See, e.g., D. Millon, Piercing the corporate veil, Financial responsibility, and the limits of limited
liability, Washington & Lee public studies research paper series, Working paper 2006-08, 3,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=932959 (accessed 11 Apr. 2019).
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jurisdiction, the less important the doctrine on veil piercing will become, and the more
certainty can be provided. In its current setting, it seems that many uncertainties
remain in the different countries where veil piercing is found in case law. First, a
variety of persons responsible for the shortcomings in the company’s performance
leading to the question to pierce the corporate veil can be found: the parent company,
the controlling shareholder(s), director(s) or shadow director(s). Second, there is a
dichotomy as to when piercing the corporate veil can be introduced as a plea: in cases
of insolvency or even outside the scope of formal insolvency proceedings. It results in
different parties that can file a case for veil piercing. Third and not least, the reasons for
applying the lifting of the corporate veil are different: they range from general
misconduct over specific actions, such as asset commingling, to even faultless liability.
The latter often affects the size of the claim that can be initiated.
Statutory rules can further reduce these uncertainties. At the European level, two
relatively novel approaches deserve to be studied as to their effectiveness. First, the
Alternative Investment Fund Directive provides limitations of asset stripping.85 When
an alternative investment fund acquires control over a non-listed company, the latter
company is, for a period of two years, not allowed to make any distribution, capital
reduction, share redemption or acquisition of own shares when it would adversely
affect the financial condition of the company86. The alternative investment fund is not
allowed to vote for any kind of asset stripping that the governing body of the company
lists as an item on the agenda at the general meeting, and the fund must even use its
best efforts to prevent any kind of asset stripping. The latter rules add objective
elements87 as to what can trigger the liability of a controlling shareholder. Second,
according to the proposal for a directive on cross-border conversions, mergers and
divisions, Member States’ supervisory agencies must prevent that ‘artificial arrange-
ment aimed at obtaining undue tax advantages or at unduly prejudicing the legal or
contractual rights of employees, creditors or minority members’ can take place.88 This
approach brings in an ex ante assessment which could help preventing that ex post
court assessments leading to veil piercing would take place.89
Alternatively, the question can be raised to what extent there is room for other
related doctrines to protect creditors from certain abusive practices developed by the
courts based on general principles of law. This is particularly the case for the German
and Dutch jurisprudence on asset stripping based on tort law. Another important
85. Art. 30 of Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011
on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and
2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, Pb. L 175, 1 July 2011
(hereinafter the AIFM Directive).
86. The conditions can be found in Art. 30, §§ 2 and 3 of the AIFM Directive.
87. It should be noted that according to the AIFM Directive, the alternative investment fund can still
withhold its votes and consequently, the resolution can be passed. We would support the
statutory rule that the controlling shareholder must vote against this resolution. However, the
alternative investment fund must show how it tried to prevent any kind of asset stripping.
88. Art. 86 c and 86 k of the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 as regards cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions,
25 Apr. 2018, SWD(2018) 141 final.
89. Critically, however, Karsten Engsig Sørensen in Chapter 12 of this book.
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example in that respect is the jurisprudence that exists in some countries regarding the
subordination of shareholder loans,90 which could be considered a sort of shareholder
liability in case of undercapitalisation. Particularly in a European continental setting,
we are rather critical as to the desirability of the latter type of concepts on shareholder
liability developed by the courts, besides the doctrine of veil piercing. Where the
essential characteristics of a company are being abused to the detriment of creditors,
and statutory rules cannot lead to a desirable outcome, veil piercing seems to be the
appropriate answer. Other doctrines developed by the courts create more uncertainty
and threaten to undermine the idea of limited liability.91
§8.05 CONCLUSION
Our analysis shows that most legal systems acknowledge that the corporate form can
be abused. The corporate form not only brings great prosperity but it can also, in rather
exceptional circumstances, be helpful to defraud other parties involved in corporate
life. However, making a distinction between an appropriate and an inappropriate use
of the corporate form is particularly difficult and therefore requires very careful
investigation and consideration in order to avoid that the major benefits of establishing
a company are forfeited. Consequently, many countries have a specific, most of the
time, ex post judicial approach for veil piercing and some sort of liability rules for
shareholders. However, legislators also try to play an important role in reducing the
uncertainty that is being caused by the concept of veil piercing. An illustration of a
legislative ex ante measure is the requirement for establishing a financial plan upon
formation of the company in which the founders must determine the financial needs of
their company sufficient for its operational activities. Despite all the measures,
uncertainty remains as to when abuse of the corporate form exists, as well as the
questions how to prevent and to remedy the abusive use of the corporate form.
One measure which we suggest to further limit the likelihood of the abusive use
of the corporate form is the generalisation of the limitation for alternative investment
fund managers supporting a distribution of a company’s assets in the aftermath of a
take-over. Similarly, supervisory agencies should be given a chance to contribute to the
prevention of the abusive use of the corporate form by raising questions in circum-
stances of cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions of companies. These
statutory rules can help in reducing the uncertainty surrounding the application of veil
piercing, but we acknowledge that the role of the courts in assessing the behaviour of
corporate incumbents justifying veil piercing will remain pivotal.
90. See in this respect, e.g., A. Cahn, Equitable subordination of shareholder loans? 287-300 (EBOR
2006).
91. Like it has been the case in the Netherlands where the Nimox jurisprudence (cf. supra) served
as one of the arguments to completely reform the (liability) rules on profit distributions for
closed companies; Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 31058, no 3, p. 33.
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